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From  P ositiv ism  to Realism : 
T he P hilosophy o f Gustav 
B ergm ann
WILLIAM HEALD
G u stav  B ergm ann  w as b o rn  in  V ienna, 
A ustria , in  1906. H e received  his P h .D  in  m athem atics from  the  
U niversity  of V ienna in  1928. Shortly  before  h e  received  th is 
degree he  w as inv ited  by  Friedrich  W aism ann  to  a tte n d  a 
w eekly series of m eetings of p h ilo so p h ers , scientists, m a th e ­
m aticians an d  o th er in tellectuals u n d e r  the  gu idance  of M oritz 
Schlick, a g roup  th a t has since becom e k n o w n  as the  " V ienna 
Circle" an d  is generally  associated  w ith  th e  ph ilosoph ical 
m ovem en t k n o w n  as " logical positiv ism ". In  1931 B ergm ann 
accom panied  W alter M ayer, h is d isse rta tion  adv iso r, to  Berlin, 
G erm any, w here  th ey  b o th  w o rk ed  w ith  M ayer's  friend  A lbert 
E instein, assisting  h im  w ith  som e of th e  m ore  com plex m a th ­
em atical aspects of h is w ork  in  physics.
A t this tim e it w as nearly  im possib le  for som eone w h o  w as 
Jew ish (as B ergm ann w as) to teach  at a u n ivers ity  level in  e ither 
G erm any or A ustria; am bitious Jew ish  in te llectuals w ere  m ore 
or less restric ted  to  a career in  m edicine o r law . For th is  reaso n  
B ergm ann reen te red  the  un iversity , a n d  finally  received  a law  
degree from  the  U niversity  of V ienna in  1935. H e w o rk ed  as a 
corporate law yer u n til 1938, a t w h ich  tim e the  level of N azi 
dom ination  of A ustria  h a d  becom e so pervasive  th a t B ergm ann  
w as forced to leave. H is first stop  w as th e  H ag u e  w h ere  O tto  
N eu ra th  gave h im  en o u g h  m oney  to  enab le  em ig ration  to  the  
U nited  States. O nce in  the  U.S. B ergm ann  briefly  w ork ed  for 
an  in su rance  com pany  in  N ew  York City, w h ere  he  con tem ­
p lated  becom ing an  accoun tan t. H e w as in v ited  in stead  to  Iow a
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City, Iow a, to  w ork  w ith  th e  G estalt psychologist K urt Lewin, 
w h o  w as a t th a t tim e w ork ing  for the  Iow a C hild  W elfare 
R esearch Station. L ew in w as a t the  tim e a ttem p tin g  to  app ly  
m athem atica l topo logy  to  h is w ork  in  psychology an d  Berg­
m an n  h a d  a deg ree  of expertise  in  th is area, as w ell as a 
m easu re  of fam iliarity  w ith  experim ental psychology an d  p sy ­
choanalysis. B ergm ann  accep ted  a one-year position  w ith  
L ew in  as a research  associate a n d  travelled  w ith  h im  to 
H arv a rd  a n d  Berkeley. The association  d id  n o t last long as 
B ergm ann  becam e convinced  th a t L ew in 's  program m atic  in ten ­
tions w ere  u n ten ab le , b u t th ro u g h  it B ergm ann m et m any  
psycho log ists a t The U niversity  of Iow a a n d  e lsew here in  the 
U.S. w ith  w h o m  he  d id  su b seq u en tly  en joy  intellectually  
fru itfu l re la tionsh ip s (K enneth  Spence of The U niversity  of 
Iow a, m o st notably).
A p p o in ted  as a tem p o rary  " lec tu re r"  in  p h ilo so p h y  in  the 
early  1940s a t The U niversity  of Iow a, B ergm ann w as soon 
m ade  an  a ssis tan t p ro fesso r (1944) a n d  by  1950 h ad  becom e a 
full p ro fesso r in  b o th  th e  P h ilo sophy  a n d  Psychology d e p a rt­
m en ts . In  1967 B ergm ann  w as elected  p res id en t of the  A m eri­
can Philosoph ical A ssociation  a n d  in  1972 becam e a C arver 
P rofessor. Officially re tired  in  1974, he  co n tin u ed  to  teach  in  the 
Psychology d e p a rtm e n t for tw o  m ore years an d  con tinued  to 
w rite  an d  do  research  in  p h ilo so p h y  u n til h is d ea th  in  1987.
A s so o n  as B ergm ann  h a d  becom e a ttached  to  The U niversity  
of Iow a he  b eg an  w riting  a n d  pub lish in g  articles abou t ph ilo s­
ophy . A t first, as m igh t have  b een  expected , m any  of his 
concerns w ere  w ith  the  p h ilo so p h y  of science an d  scientific 
m eth o d , especially  th e  m ethodo logy  of psychology. Berg­
m a n n 's  th o ro u g h g o in g  com m itm en t to  the  em piricistic m eth ­
ods of th e  n a tu ra l sciences co incided  exactly w ith  the  outlook  of 
the  "w o rk in g "  psycho log ists a t The U niversity  of Iow a, w ho  
believed  th a t the  p ro p e r  m eth o d  of psychology consisted  of 
observa tion  of behav io r an d  exp lanation  of behav io r in  term s of 
s tim u lu s-resp o n se  m echan ism s. N everthe less, as a ph ilo so ­
p h e r  (and  n o t m erely  a p h ilo so p h e r of science), B ergm ann w as 
em phatically  n o t a behav iorist. T hat is, w hile  he  d id  believe
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th a t psycho log ists m u st restric t them selves to an  exam ination 
of the  re la tionsh ip s  b e tw e en  th e  value  of physical variables (as 
m u st all n a tu ra l scientists), he  d id  n o t believe, con trary  to the 
claim s of som e behav io ral psycho log ists (m ost no toriously , 
B.F. Skinner), th a t th e re  are no  m en ta l (nonphysical) th ings 
a n d  even ts , such  as pe rcep tions , th o u g h ts  an d  desires. This 
rejection  of "m etaphysica l behav io rism " w as closely tied  to 
B ergm ann 's  a b a n d o n m e n t of logical positiv ism , a topic to 
w h ich  I n o w  tu rn .
The logical positiv ists  w h o  first m o ld ed  B ergm ann 's  th ink ­
ing, a n d  am ong  w h o m  he  no  d o u b t co u n ted  h im self even  until, 
p e rh a p s , the  late 1930s o r early  1940s, d id  n o t constitu te  an  
ideologically  m onolith ic  g roup . N everthe less th ey  shared  a 
basic ou tlook , sim ilar ph ilosoph ical goals a n d  even , as Berg­
m an n  h im self w as la ter to  em phasize , a n u m b er of p h ilo soph ­
ical beliefs. P rim arily  th ey  sh a red  a respec t for the  achieve­
m en ts  of m athem atics a n d  n a tu ra l science, as w ell as the  desire 
to  see the  fo rm er " d e m y s tif ie d " —by be ing  d em o n stra ted  to  be 
an  ex tension  of log ic—a n d  th e  la tte r ex ten d ed  to encom pass 
psycho logy  a n d  the  social sciences.
The less positive, in d ee d  th e  negative, side of logical posi­
tiv ism  invo lved  the  em phatic  rejection of all p rev ious types of 
ph ilo soph ical inqu iry , especially  "m e tap h y sics" , construed  as 
a p u re ly  ra tional a n d  a priori (tha t is, non-em pirical) inquiry  
in to  the  m o st genera l a n d  pervasive  fea tu res of reality. A 
sim ilarly  negative  a ttitu d e  to w ard  theology, eth ics, aesthetics 
an d  o th e r form s of non-scientific  theo riz ing  w as w idely  ac­
cep ted . E ven those  positiv ists  w h o  h a d  extrem ely  strong  e th i­
cal, political or aesthetic  "o p in io n s"  w ere  philosophically com ­
m itted  to  the  v iew  th a t th e  assertions by  m eans of w hich  such 
o p in ions w o u ld  be exp ressed  are them selves really  "p se u d o ­
s ta te m e n ts"  th a t are em p ty  of "cognitive  c o n ten t"  in  the  sense 
th a t th ey  do  n o t, as do  the  s ta tem en ts  of n a tu ra l science, 
rep re sen t s ta tes  of affairs w hich , if actual, m ake the  s ta tem en ts 
tru e  (and  if n o t, m ake th em  false).
If one w ere  to  encapsu la te  these  a ttitu d es  in  p ropositions, 
the  fo llow ing w o u ld  p e rh a p s  serve as w ell as any:
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(1) All " necessary  tru th s " , p ro p o sitio n s  w h o se  tru th  can be 
de te rm ined  by  reason  alone w ith o u t recourse  to  ex p erien ce— 
an d  especially the  p ropositions  of m a th em a tic s—are " a n a ­
lytic". T hat is, th ey  can be sh o w n  to be, g iven  the  p ro p er 
definitions of the  w o rd s  by  m ean s of w h ich  they  are expressed , 
instances of p rincip les of logic.
(2) The claim s an d  theo ries of trad itional p h ilo so p h y —an d  
especially those  of m e tap h y sic s—are either:
(a) really assertions w hose  tru th  can be d e te rm in ed  by  the  
em pirical m eth o d s of n a tu ra l science, or
(b) th ey  are  analytic, a n d  are tru e  in  v irtue  of the  defin itions 
of the  w o rd s u sed  to  express them , or
(c) th ey  are " nonsensica l"  a n d  really  have  no  cognitive 
con ten t at all.
M etaphysical claim s w ere  generally  assigned  to  the  last of these  
categories, u sually  w ith  en thusiastic  glee.
(3) Ethical an d  aesthetic  s ta tem en ts  a n d  theo ries are , like those  
of trad itional p h ilo sophy , p se u d o -s ta tem en ts  an d  po ssess  no  
cognitive con ten t. In  general, any s ta tem en ts  th a t (p u rp o rt to) 
assert the  value of som eth ing  m oral, aesthetic , political or 
o therw ise , are all in  the  sam e boat; since the  " tru th "  of such  
sta tem en ts canno t be d e te rm in ed  in  a " scientifically respec t­
able" m an n er, the  only  m ean ing  th ey  have  is "exp ressive" . 
T hat is, all such  assertions "m ere ly "  express th e  feelings, desires 
an d  a ttitu d es  of the  p e rso n  w h o  u tte rs  them ; th ey  do  n o t 
represent an y th ing , a n d  th u s  can n o t be tru e  or false.
(4) The p ro p er  task  of p h ilo so p h y  is clarification of the  concep ts 
em ployed  by o rd inary  descrip tive d iscourse  a n d  n a tu ra l sci­
ence. There is, p resum ab ly , no  d istinctive so rt of m etaphysica l 
know ledge an d  th ere  are no  m etaphysica l theories; the  only  
possib le task  rem ain ing  to p h ilo so p h y  is to  d isp lay  th e  logic of 
the  concepts, m ake d istinctions th a t will h e lp  p rev e n t con fu ­
sion, ren d e r  o rd ina ry  language  less am b iguous, m ore precise, 
and  th u s  less likely to  give rise to  concep tual confusion . M any, 
if n o t all, of the  positiv ists  th o u g h t of m etaphysics a n d  the
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w hole  of trad itional p h ilo so p h y  itself as a w eb  of such  confu­
sions, a n d  believed  th a t it w o u ld  sim ply  d isap p ear if language 
w ere  re n d e re d  p recise en o u g h  to  m ake confusion  abou t the 
logical form  of the  sta tes of affairs rep re sen te d  by  s ta tem en ts 
im possible.
T hese convictions m u st clearly be th o u g h t of as preludes to 
ph ilosoph ical a rg u m en t ra th e r  th an  the  resu lts  of such  a rg u ­
m en t; as th ey  s tan d  th ey  are obv iously  very  controversial and  
no n e  of th em  is b y  an y  m ean s obvious. To the  logical positivists 
the  less con troversial A rch im edean  p o in t on  the  basis of w hich  
th ese  con ten tious claim s w ere  to be estab lished  w as an  am al­
gam  of p rinc ip les an d  beliefs k n o w n  as "verifica tion ism ''. 
V erificationists he ld  th a t a s ta tem en t (or a sen tence  pu rp o rted ly  
used to  m ake a s ta tem en t) h as  "cogn itive  c o n ten t" , "descrip tive 
m ean in g "  or " lite ral m ea n in g " , if a n d  only  if it is verifiable, tha t 
is, if th ere  is, a t least in  p rincip le , som e m eans by  w hich  its 
tru th  value  (tha t is, its tru th  o r falsehood) can be know n. Thus 
a sen tence  such  as "Ju lius C aesar h a d  a m ole on  the  inside of 
h is rig h t th ig h "  is, practically  speak ing , unverifiable; n ev erth e ­
less, w e can  im agine w h a t so rts of p ro ced u res  an d  percep tions 
would tell u s  w h e th e r  the  s ta tem en t expressed  by the  sen tence 
is true  or false; in  k n o w in g  w h a t w o u ld  show  the  s ta tem en t to 
be tru e  w e k now  th e  meaning of th e  sta tem en t. But o ther 
sen tences, such  as "T he  m ateria l w orld  is an  illu sion", "Justice 
is b e tte r  th a n  h a p p in e ss" , or "T he reaso n  there  is som eth ing  
ra th e r  th a n  n o th in g  is G o d 's  overflow ing  g o o d n ess" , are all, 
p resum ab ly , n o t verifiable, since th ere  is no  p rocedure  tha t 
could  show  th em  to be tru e  (or false).
It sh o u ld  be obvious th a t the  positiv ists  could  n o t hope  to 
m ake o u t such  claim s w ith o u t h av ing  a fairly precise concep­
tion  of a " m e th o d  of verifica tion", for all of the  above "non- 
verifiab le" s ta tem en ts  have  been  sincerely  asserted , an d  as­
se rted  on  the  basis of th o u g h t, reason ing , a n d  even , arguably , 
experience. The positiv ists  d id  in d eed  strugg le  to m ake the 
verification princip le  p recise e n o u g h  to  d en y  the  s ta tu s  of 
"cogn itively  sign ificant" to  ev ery th ing  th ey  felt w as n o t a 
m a tte r  of sober, im partial, a n d  ra tional inqu iry  w hile g ran ting
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this s ta tu s  to every th ing  th ey  felt w as. Since the  la tte r category 
included  the  n a tu ra l sciences and m athem atics th ey  h a d  to 
com e u p  w ith  a fo rm ula tion  of th e ir criterion  th a t could  
encom pass b o th  of th ese  very  d ifferen t so rts  of sta tem en t.
W ithou t going in to  the  to rtu o u s  details of the  m an y  con ­
certed  a ttem p ts  to find an  ad eq u ate  fo rm ula tion  of a m ean ing  
criterion th a t w o u ld  do  precisely  w h a t w as expected  of it an d  
no  m ore, the  ou tlines of th e  effort are fairly stra igh tfo rw ard . All 
m ean ingfu l s ta tem en ts  w ere  declared  to  be of one of either of 
tw o sorts of s ta tem en t; one sort w as called "ana ly tic"  a n d  the  
o ther so rt could  be called "em pirica l". Em pirical s ta tem en ts  are 
e ither "observa tion  s ta te m e n ts" , s ta tem en ts  w h ich  describe 
w h a t can be perceived  or observed  to be the  case, o r th ey  are 
s ta tem en ts th a t can be sh o w n  to be true  on  the  basis of 
evidence p ro v id ed  by  observation  s ta tem en ts . A nalytic s ta te ­
m en ts  are s ta tem en ts  th a t are  e ither su b stitu tio n  in stances  of 
logical p rincip les o r th ey  are  s ta tem en ts  th a t can be " re d u c e d  
to" such  sta tem en ts  by  su b s titu tin g  defin ing  term s for the 
term s they  define. C onsider, for exam ple, the  fo llow ing logical 
principle:
(A) If som eth ing  has all of a g iven  set of p ro p ertie s , it has any  
one of them .
A substitu tion  in stance  of th is p rincip le  m igh t be:
(B) If som eth ing  is b o th  u n m arried  a n d  a m ale th en  it is 
unm arried .
N ow  su p p o se  th a t w e are g iven  the  fo llow ing sta tem en t:
(C) If som eth ing  is a bachelo r th en  it is u nm arried .
If w e allow  th a t th e  w o rd  "b ach e lo r"  is defined  as an y th in g  
(or an y th in g  hu m an ) th a t is bo th  m ale an d  u n m arried , th e n  w e 
can substitu te  the  p h rase  "m ale  a n d  u n m arrie d "  for the  term  
"bachelo r"  in  (C), th u s  ob ta in ing  (B), a su b s titu tio n  in stance  of 
(A). A nd  since (A) canno t be false (since it is a princip le  of 
logic), n e ith e r can (C).
The verificationists in sis ted  th a t all (cognitively significant) 
p ropositions or s ta tem en ts  th a t are  n o t em pirical are  analytic
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(and  vice-versa), an d  m ay  th u s  be " re d u c e d " , in  the  above- 
ske tched  m an n e r, to  (substitu tion  in stances of) p rincip les of 
logic.
Since m athem atics is clearly com posed  of s ta tem en ts  th a t are 
non-em pirical, th ey  m u st by  th e  criterion  be analytic. In 
Principia Mathematica, B ertrand  R ussell, w h o  a lth o u g h  n o t a 
logical positiv ist w as g reatly  ad m ired  by  them  (and  by Berg­
m ann), p re se n te d  a system atic  a tte m p t to  dem o n stra te  th a t the 
en tire  b o d y  of basic arithm etic  could  in d ee d  be derived  from  
logic, th a t is, th a t all th e  s ta tem en ts  of arithm etic  are analytic. 
A lth o u g h  th e re  w ere  m an y  prob lem s w ith  h is a ttem p t (about 
w h ich  m ore  p resen tly ), it w as a t first h o p e d  an d  believed  tha t 
th ey  cou ld  be rem ed ied  w ith  m in o r m odifications of the  basic 
p rog ram . The im portance  of th e  red u c tio n  of m athem atics to 
logic consisted  in  th e  fact th a t m athem atics h a d  for centuries 
p ro v id ed  a k in d  of m odel of the  perfect "sc ience ,"  a science, 
m oreover, th a t ap p lied  to  reality  b u t w hose  theories w ere  no t 
estab lished  on  th e  basis of an  appeal to sense experience. The 
trad itional m etaphysic ians w h o se  w orks the  positiv ists  sough t 
to consign  to  the  tra sh  h e a p  could  po in t to m athem atics as an  
illu stra tion  of w h a t th ey  w ere  doing; the  on ly  difference, 
p resum ab ly , w as th a t m athem atics investiga ted  p lurality , p ro ­
p o rtio n  a n d  m easu re  w hile  p h ilo so p h ers  investiga ted  m ind  
an d  m atte r, G od  a n d  m an , know ledge  a n d  tru th , goodness and  
b eau ty , an d  the  like. But if m athem atics is construed , as the 
positiv ists  w o u ld  have  u s  construe  it, as a system atic derivation  
of the  consequences of " m e re "  co n v e n tio n s—d efin itio n s—th en  
it no  longer p ro v id es  an  appealing  m odel for those  w h o  w an t to 
acquire g en u in e  know ledge  to  construe  w h a t th ey  are do ing  as 
the  acquisition  of k n ow ledge , for the  "k n o w led g e"  of the 
m athem atic ian  on  th is v iew  is n o t based  u p o n  any  sort of 
ra tional in sig h t in to  th e  abstract s truc tu re  of reality  b u t is, 
ra th e r, m ere ly  an  "u n fo ld in g "  of conven tional ru les for using  
w o rd s, ju s t as "bachelo rs  are  u n m arried  m ales"  expresses the  
conven tional m ean in g  of the  w o rd  "bache lo r" . W hile such  an  
activity  is, in d eed , an  ex trem ely  significant h u m an  skill, and  
one th a t is vital for the  n a tu ra l sciences, it is n o t itself a genu ine
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form  of know ledge. A  m athem atic ian  can n o t be said  to have 
know ledge of, say, n u m b ers , in  the  sam e sense  th a t a biologist 
has a know ledge of an im als o r a physic ist a k n ow ledge  of 
atom s.
H ow ever appealing  verificationism  once seem ed , the  en tire  
p rog ram  en co u n te red  in superab le  difficulties. M uch th a t the  
verificationist w a n te d  to be considered  m ean ing fu l w as sh o w n  
to be in  fact m ean ing less by  th e  fo rm ula tions of the  m ean ing  
criterion su ggested  by  positiv ists. T hat is, m uch  of n a tu ra l 
science w as sh o w n  to be non-derivab le  from  observational 
evidence. O thers  sh o w ed , conversely , th a t sen tences th a t are 
obviously nonsensica l (R ussell's exam ple: " G reen  ideas sleep 
furiously") could  in  fact be  sh o w n  to  be cognitively  significant 
by  the  criterion. R ussell's  a tte m p t to  derive m athem atics from  
logic w as finally recogn ized  to  involve m an y  m ore serious 
difficulties th an  w as initially  realized , difficulties th a t accord ing  
to m ost specialists are  unso lvab le  in  p rincip le . A n d  in d eed , 
even  if there  h a d  b een  no  p rob lem  w ith  h is p rog ram , it w o u ld  
still n o t have ad vanced  the  basic v iew po in t th a t th e  positiv ists  
h o p ed  it w ou ld , for, as m an y  critics of positiv ism  have  con ­
vincingly a rgued , red u c tio n  of an  analytic  s ta tem en t to  a 
substitu tion  princip le  of logic only  " sh o w s"  th a t s ta tem en t to 
be true  u p o n  the  a ssu m p tio n  th a t th a t p rincip le  of logic itself is 
true. A ttem p ts  to  fu rth e r " red u ce"  these  p rincip les to substi­
tu tion  in stances of ye t fu rth e r  p rinc ip les of logic are n o t only  
in superab ly  difficult b u t w o u ld  clearly involve begg ing  the  
question , for w e w o u ld  still n eed  to  k n o w  in  genera l w h y  
princip les of logic are  true .
I have n o t g iven  the  details of all th ese  objections a n d  the  
coun ter-a rgum en ts th ey  elicited because  an  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of 
them  w o u ld  requ ire  som e expertise  in  logic. But one fairly 
s tra igh tfo rw ard  objection to  verificationism  can , I th in k , be 
g rasped  by  anyone. The objection a ttem p ts  to  focus th e  crite­
rion  u p o n  itself ask ing  " Is the  verificationist criterion  of m ean ­
ing  cognitively significant?" T hat is, is the  s ta tem en t " O nly  
verifiable (i.e., analytic o r em pirical) s ta tem en ts  are  m ean in g ­
ful" itself m eaningfu l? C learly it is n o t an  em pirical tru th ;
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verificationists d id  n o t search  th ro u g h  the  s ta tem en ts  tha t 
peop le  have  m ade , find  those  th a t are  cognitively significant 
a n d  th e n  d iscover th a t each  of th em  is e ither em pirical or 
analytic. N or, on  the  o th e r h a n d , is it analytic; it certain ly  is no t 
p a rt  of the  meaning of "m ean in g fu l"  th a t a m ean ingfu l sta te ­
m en t m u st be e ither em pirical or analytic. It follow s tha t, by the 
verification ist criterion  of m ean ing , the  verificationist criterion 
of m ean in g  is m ean ing less a n d  th a t those , therefore , w ho  
esp o u se  it are  m o u th in g  m etaphysica l nonsense .
The cen tral convictions th a t dom ina te  B ergm ann 's ph iloso­
p h iz in g  m ay  be p laced  in to  tw o  groups: (1) h is metaphilosophical 
v iew s abou t w h a t p h ilo so p h y  is a n d  h o w  it sh o u ld  be p u rsu ed , 
an d  (2) h is metaphysical v iew s p ro p er, nam ely , h is v iew s abou t 
the  n a tu re  of th e  co n ten ts  a n d  the  genera l struc tu re  of reality.
A s to  the  first a n d  m o st significant of the  form er, B ergm ann 's 
fu n d am en ta l p recep t clearly is w h a t can only  be called " th e  
unavo idab ility  of m etap h y sics" . Classical ph ilosophical p rob ­
lem s, such  as the  m ind -body  p rob lem , the  n a tu re  of the  causal 
re la tionsh ip , th e  n a tu re  of a priori know ledge an d  deductive 
reason ing , o r the  s ta tu s  of p rincip les of m oral value, canno t be 
seriously  ad d re sse d  u n less  one ad o p ts , p e rh a p s  covertly or 
im plicitly, som e ph ilosoph ical opinion ab o u t th e  issue  in  ques­
tion. O n e  m ay , for exam ple, com e to  believe th a t the  m ental 
s ta tes  of peop le  are identical to  the  s ta tes  of their b rains, or tha t 
a p e rso n 's  m en ta l s ta tes  are  n o th in g  m ore  th an  th a t p e rso n 's  
tendenc ies  to  behave  in  certain  w ays. In  e ither of these  cases 
one  w o u ld  be a "m ateria lis t" . O r one m ay, on  the  o th er han d , 
in sist th a t a p e rso n 's  m en ta l sta tes, w hile  causally  re la ted  to 
b o th  b ra in  s ta tes  an d  behav ior, are  identical to  ne ither; in  this 
case one  is a "d u a lis t" . O ne  m ay  even  be led , as B ergm ann 
h im self w as for a considerable  p o rtion  of h is ph ilosophical 
career, to  em brace th e  v iew  th a t "ev e ry th in g  is m en ta l" , in  the 
sense  th a t all th a t exists are sense  da ta , the  p ropertie s  of and  
rela tions b e tw e en  sense  data , a n d  o th er m en ta l sta tes like 
perceiv ing , rem em bering  a n d  believing. In  th is case, one is (a 
certain  so rt of) " id ea lis t" . Finally, one m ay  believe th a t all th a t 
exists are en tities so m ew h at like sense  da ta  b u t w h ich  m ay be
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considered  either m en ta l or n o n -m en ta l d e p e n d in g  u p o n  the  
context in  w h ich  th ey  are  considered ; th is v iew  is called 
" n eu tra l m on ism ".
The im p o rtan t p o in t he re  is th a t whichever of th ese  positions 
one ad o p ts , B ergm ann felt, one  m u st ho ld  one  of th em  (or 
p e rh ap s  som e varia tion  of one  of them ) if one  seriously  engages 
the  p rob lem s a n d  issues involved . To glibly asse rt th a t " the  
m ind-body  p rob lem  is a p seu d o -p ro b lem " is sim ply an  in ad e ­
quate  response  to these  issues a n d  p rob lem s, a n d  it be trays an  
unw illingness to  deal w ith  th em  articulately . B ergm ann  ac­
cused  m any  of the  positiv ists  of h o ld in g  various of these  
classical m etaphysica l positions, b u t of d o ing  so im plicitly  a n d  
therefore  inarticu late ly , largely  because  th ey  w ere  unw illing  to 
adm it th a t w h a t th ey  w ere  en g ag ed  in  w as m etaphysics, a 
system atic a ttem p t to describe the  genera l s tru c tu re  of reality.
B ergm ann 's second  m etaph ilosoph ica l conviction  is h is con­
ception  of p ro p er  ph ilosoph ical method. B ergm ann  believed  
th a t trad itional ph ilosoph ical theo ries  w ere  exp ressed  w ith  
nonliteral u ses  of w o rd s (he called th em  "p h ilo soph ica l u ses"). 
W hen a p h ilo so p h er asserts  th a t "R eality  is sp iritu a l" , "O n ly  
m atter ex ists", or "H u m a n  beings can  have  no  k n o w led g e" , he  
or she is u s in g  the  w o rd s  in  these  sen tences (at least som e of 
them ) in  a figurative, n o n -o rd in a ry  sense . L iterally speak ing , 
there  are a g rea t m any  th in g s in  th e  u n iverse  th a t are n o t 
"sp iritu a l"  (for exam ple, the  chair on  w h ich  I am  n o w  sitting), 
m any  th ings th a t are n o t "m ateria l"  (for exam ple, m y p re se n t 
percep tion  of the  p e n  I am  u s in g  to w rite  th is sen tence), a n d  
there  are certain ly  som e th in g s I could  be said  to " k n o w "  (for 
exam ple, th a t the  p e n  w ith  w h ich  I am  n o w  w riting  con ta ins 
blue ink). A nyone  w h o  seriously  asse rted  the  p ro p o sitio n s  in 
question , w hile  tak ing  th em  literally, w o u ld  be, n o t sim ply  
w rong , b u t qu ite  in sane . But, B ergm ann  claim ed, p h ilo so p h ers  
w ere n o t speak ing  literally w h e n  th ey  m ad e  th ese  claims; th ey  
w ere, ra ther, try ing  to  p ress  o rd in a ry  w o rd s  in to  th e  service of 
ph ilo sophy , a so m ew h at ex trao rd inary  service for w h ich  their 
original roles in  o rd ina ry  language  do  n o t p rep a re  them .
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But w h a t, th en , is ph ilo so p h y , a n d  w h a t are ph ilosophers 
try ing  to  do  by  u s in g  o rd ina ry  expression  in  ex traord inary  
w ays? A ccord ing  to  B ergm ann  th ey  are  in d eed  try ing  to describe 
th e  w orld , b u t  on ly  in  a very  genera l a n d  ind irect m anner. The 
m an n e r of descrip tion  em p loyed  by  p h ilo so p h ers  is d isp layed  
by  B ergm ann 's  m e th o d , the  " ideal language  m e th o d " , a tech­
n ique  em p loyed  by  several of the  positiv ists , as w ell as Ber­
tra n d  R ussell, p e rh a p s  W ittgenste in  (a lthough  he  den ied  it), 
a n d  o th e r early  tw en tie th -cen tu ry  linguistic ph ilo sophers. The 
techn ique  involves u s in g  form al languages, artificial calculi. 
The m otivation  for u sin g  such  calculi is the  relative precision  of 
th e ir syn tax  a n d  sem antics. The "logical g ram m ar"  (i.e., the 
syntax) of a form al language  m akes com pletely  explicit the 
logical s tru c tu re  of the  objects a n d  facts w h ich  the  language is 
u se d  to  describe. In  o rd in a ry  language  sen tences rep resen tin g  
facts w ith  en tire ly  d ifferen t so rts of logical form  m ay  be 
rep re sen te d  by  sen tences  w ith  nearly  sim ilar gram m atical 
s truc tu res . C om pare , for exam ple: (a) "M ary  is h a p p y " , an d  (b) 
"C erb e ru s  is rea l" . The fo rm er asserts  of an  ind iv idual object 
th a t it p o ssesses  a g iven  p ro p erty , the  p ro p erty  of happ iness. 
The latter, how ever, asserts  so m eth in g  som ew hat m ore com ­
plicated; it asserts  th a t (if w e follow  Russell) "T here  is an  object 
th a t is a th ree -h ead ed  d o g  g u a rd in g  the  gates of H ell an d  there  
is on ly  one  such  object". A  m ore  "log ically-persp icuous" 
language  w o u ld  m ake confusion  on  th is p o in t im possible; one 
w o u ld  be able to  sim ply  " re a d  off" the  logical form  of the 
objects a n d  s ta tes  of affairs rep re sen te d  by  the  sen tences of the 
language . It w as the  belief of m o st positiv ists  th a t trad itional 
ph ilo so p h y , especially  m etaphysics, w as based  u p o n  the  con­
fusions g e n e ra ted  by  th e  im precision  a n d  am bigu ity  of o rd i­
n a ry  language , a n d  th a t once such  im precision  w as rectified by 
a m ore precise language , th ere  w o u ld  be no  m ore such  confu­
sion  a n d  m etaphysics w o u ld  w h ith e r  aw ay.
The th ird  m etaph ilosoph ica l conviction dom ina ting  Berg­
m a n n 's  th o u g h t is exp ressed  by  the  "P rincip le  of A cquain­
tan ce" , the  criterion  th a t gu ides  B ergm ann 's  in te rp re ta tio n  of 
his idea l language . The p rincip le  d em an d s  th a t the  basic
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descrip tive term s (nam es an d  p red icates) of the  I.L. schem a can 
only designate  th ings w ith  w h ich  one  is " a c q u a in te d ,"  or 
th ings th a t are  of the  sort w ith  (at least one exam ple of) w h ich  
one is "acq u a in ted " . The key  term  of the  p rincip le  is doub le- 
q uo ted  because its m ean ing  is far from  b e ing  o rd in a ry  or 
obvious. It is obvious th a t th e  princip le  is an  a tte m p t to  cap tu re  
the  empiricism th a t B ergm ann  in h erited  from  the  logical posi­
tivists. T hus 'acq u ain tan ce ' m eans 'ex p erien ce ', in  som e sense , 
an d  the  P rinciple of A cquain tance is essentia lly  the  claim  th a t a 
m etaphysician  sh o u ld  acknow ledge the  existence of no en tities 
except those  th a t he  h as  experienced  o r th a t are  of th e  so rt he  
could experience. The n a tu ra l w ay  to  in te rp re t 'experience ' is, 
of course, as 'p erce ive ' (see, hear, sm ell, etc.), b u t B ergm ann  
places m ore s tr in g en t req u irem en ts  on  the  n o tio n  of acquain ­
tance. As w e ord inarily  speak , w e say  "I see th a t th e  m eter 
reads 130 d eg rees" , "I see th a t the  cup  is on  the  tab le" , "I h e a rd  
the  bone  b reak  d u rin g  th e  collision", or even , m u ch  m ore 
loosely, "I see y o u 're  n o t feeling w ell to d ay " , or "I h e a rd  the  
neighbors hav ing  a p a rty  last n ig h t" . The so rts  of cases 
described  by  th e  last tw o  sen tences m ake it clear th a t w e o ften  
speak , w ell w ith in  the  b o u n d s  of o rd ina ry  usage , of perceiv ing  
som eth ing  w e d id n 't  really  perceive b u t only  in fe rred  from  
w h a t w e really perceived . But accord ing  to  m any  p h ilo so p h ers , 
B ergm ann included , even  the  so rt of p e rcep tio n  described  by  
the  first th ree  sen tences involves too m u ch  in ference  to  really 
be considered  the  m ost "d irec t"  so rt of experience one m igh t 
have. If I see th e  dial of a m ete r read  130 d eg rees th e n  I infer 
from  w h a t I do see (or I assum e) th a t th is th in g  is in d ee d  a 
m eter, a com plicated  m ach ine  d es ig n ed  to  ind ica te  th e  vary ing  
"d eg rees"  of som e physical q u an tity  or d im ension . M ost, if n o t 
all, of o u r o rd inary  pe rcep tu a l experience of the  w orld  of 
m aterial objects involves as m uch  a ssu m p tio n  a n d  in ference as 
"d irec t"  or " im m ed ia te"  experience.
C onsider, for exam ple, a case in  w h ich  I see a red  ball. This 
percep tion , like m ost, involves a g rea t deal of reason ing ; w h a t 
I see m ay  n o t be a ball a t all, b u t  a ba lloon , o r a law n  o rn am en t, 
or a d an g er signal from  the  gas com pany  ind ica ting  a p ipeline
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below  the  g ro u n d , o r a th o u sa n d  o th e r th ings instead . We 
m igh t try  to excise the  co n ten ts  of m y p ercep tua l ju d g em en t 
th a t " ex tend  b e y o n d "  w h a t I really  do  perceive by  rep lacing  the 
s ta tem en t th a t expresses m y percep tion , " I  see a red  ball" , w ith  
the  s ta tem en t "I see a red , sphere-like  surface, a n d  I believe th a t 
if I w ere  to  ap p ro ach  the  object a n d  exam ine it m ore closely I 
w o u ld  see — etc ." , w h e re  the  'e tc ' w o u ld  be filled in  by the 
so rts of th in g s I would see if I were to  exam ine the  object p roperly  
an d  if it were in d ee d  a red  ball. If it is suggested  th a t th is could 
be d o n e  w ith  all p e rcep tio n  sta tem en ts , th en  w h a t is being  
su g g ested  is th a t the  im m edia te  objects of percep tion  are no t 
m ateria l objects as such , b u t the  front surfaces (nam ely, those 
facing th e  perceiver) of temporal cross-sections of m aterial objects 
(nam ely, th o se  p o rtio n s  of an  object's  h isto ry  sim ultaneous 
w ith  the  pe rcep tio n  of it). Even, how ever, if th is suggestion  is 
fo llow ed, it does n o t adequate ly  excise reason ing  from  experi­
ence, for w h e n  I say  th a t "I see a red-sphere-like  surface" I am  
still m ak ing  assu m p tio n s  a n d  in ferences abou t w h a t I see. I am  
assu m in g  th a t the  ligh t is n o t of a h u e  th a t m akes non-red  
th in g s  look red  (and  I am  m ak ing  sim ilar a ssu m p tio n s abou t 
m y  eyes a n d  brain). If n o th in g  else, I am  assu m in g  th a t there  is 
in  fact a surface of som eth in g  there; th a t is, th a t I am  n o t sim ply 
ha lluc inating  o r d ream ing .
In  o rd er to  excise the  in te rp re ta tio n  of experience from  
experience itself the  concep t of acquain tance  is sim ply u n d e r­
s tood  as a type  of d irect experience of som eth ing  th a t involves 
no  con jectu re  or th o u g h t. A ccord ing  to  m any  ph ilosophers, 
includ ing  several of the  positiv ists  a n d  the  early  B ergm ann, the 
so rts of th in g s w ith  w h ich  one  cou ld  be directly  acquain ted  are 
co lored  an d  sh a p ed  areas, so u n d s  (i.e ., tones  each of w hich  has 
a p itch  a n d  a loudness), a n d  o th e r sim ilar sorts of objects of 
im m edia te  senso ry  experience (w ith  no  ju d g m e n t m ade or 
p re su p p o se d  ab o u t w h e th e r  the  experience is or is n o t halluci­
natory). A ccord ing  to B ergm ann  him self, un like all of the 
logical positiv ists , one is also directly  acquain ted  w ith  (one's 
ow n) "m en ta l ac ts" , su ch  as perceiv ings, rem em berings, be­
lievings, im agin ings, an d  so on. T hat is, o n e 's  know ledge of
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o n e 's  ow n  (p resen t) m en ta l s ta tes  has exactly the  sam e so rt of 
non in feren tia l im m ediacy as does o n e 's  aw aren ess  of the  sorts 
of senso ry  data  m en tio n ed  above; one does n o t engage in  any  
sort of reason ing  to figure o u t if one  does have  a g iven  belief, 
m em ory  or pe rcep tion , a lth o u g h  one  m ay  of course  do  so in 
o rder to d iscover if a belief o r m em ory  one h as  is correct.
B ergm ann th u s  ho ld s th a t m etaphysics is unavo idab le  if one 
is to do  p h ilo sophy  at all, th a t th e  best an d  m o st articu late  w ay  
it can be p u rsu e d  is by  construc tion  of an  ideal language  in 
term s of w hich  the  en tire  w orld  can  in  princip le  be rep re sen ted , 
and  th a t the  constra in ts  u p o n  in te rp re ta tio n  of such  a language  
are p rov ided  by  the  Principle of A cquain tance.
B ergm ann 's m etaphysics beg ins w ith  w h a t cou ld  be called 
" com m on-sense rea lism ", a v iew po in t em bracing  the  fo llow ing 
beliefs:
(1) the  w orld  con ta ins a plurality of objects a n d  so rts  of 
objects. These objects can exist, an d  be k n o w n  to exist, 
in d ep en d en tly  of o th e r such  objects. T hat is, th e  w orld  is n o t 
one ind isso luble , u n d iffe ren tia ted  to tality , an  " A b so lu te" , th a t 
can only  be k n o w n  " as a w h o le"  (and  th u s  w h ich  canno t really  
be k n o w n  at all).
(2) The objects include trees, m o u n ta in s , an d  a to m s—w hich  
are usually  called " m ateria l ob jects"; b u t th ey  also include  
" p e rso n s" , th in g s th a t are conscious a n d  th a t are  capable of 
percep tions, ra tional th o u g h t a n d  reason ing . The existence, 
p roperties  a n d  re la tionsh ip s of m ateria l objects do  n o t d e p e n d  
u p o n  the  existence of persons; m ore particu larly , the  existence 
an d  the  featu res of m ateria l objects do  n o t d e p e n d  u p o n  the  
thoughts of perso n s. O n  the  o th e r h a n d , the  m en ta l fea tu res of 
p e rso n s—their p ercep tions, feelings a n d  th o u g h ts —can in  no  
w ay  be " iden tified  w ith "  or " re d u c e d  to "  the  physica l fea tu res 
of p e rso n s ' bod ies, e ither the  s ta tes  of th e ir b ra in s or the ir 
tendencies to  behave  in  certain  w ays.
(3) People can acquire know ledge  of m in d -in d e p e n d e n t 
reality by  p ercep tion  an d  reason ing . Scientists can acquire 
know ledge of the  opera tions  of n a tu re , again , by  p ercep tion  
an d  reasoning .
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For B ergm ann, if n o t for o thers , com m on-sense  realism  m ust 
also include  the  follow ing:
(4) W hat is k n o w n  w h e n  one know s th e  tru th  of p ropositions 
of arithm etic , m athem atics a n d  logic is som eth ing  th a t in  no 
w ay  d e p e n d s  u p o n  the  existence or th o u g h ts  of persons. 
Specifically, it does n o t d e p e n d  u p o n  linguistic  conven tions or 
th e  psycho logy  of h u m a n  co m p u ta tio n  a n d  th ink ing . W hen  I 
k n o w  th a t "1 +  1 =  2" I k n o w  so m eth in g  abou t the  rela tionsh ips 
b e tw een  th ese  n u m b ers , som eth in g  th a t w o u ld  exist even  if 
p eop le  h a d  n ev er existed.
A lth o u g h  com m on-sense  realism  is w h ere  B ergm ann begins, 
it is certain ly  n o t w h ere  h is on to logy  ends. It is one  th ing  to 
give a ro u g h  genera l descrip tion  of the  w orld  of com m on sense; 
it is qu ite  a n o th e r  to  secure  such  a w orld  from  the  philosophical 
a ttacks of abso lu te  idealists, m ateria lists, skeptics, conven tion ­
alists, a n d  o th ers  w h o  w o u ld  u n d e rm in e  it. Specifically, w h a t 
B ergm ann  tried  to  do  is to  show  th a t one can dep ic t or describe 
the  w orld  of com m on  sense  w ith  an  ideal language w hose  
in te rp re ta tio n  is constra ined  by  the  P rinciple of A cquaintance. 
W hat h e  w o u n d  u p  w ith  is a ph ilosoph ical ou tlook  th a t m ight 
be called "critical rea lism " a n d  w h ich  w o u ld  p robably  n o t be 
called "com m onsensica l"  by  anyone.
To a n o n p h ilo so p h e r the  m ost s tartling  aspect of B ergm ann 's 
on to logy  w o u ld  n o  d o u b t be h is com m itted  an ti­
substan tia lism . The term  "su b stan ce"  is u se d  by  ph ilosophers 
to  designa te  an y  particu la r th in g  th a t u n d e rg o es  change (that 
is, a change of p ro p ertie s  or rela tions) a n d  y e t rem ains the  sam e 
th in g  th ro u g h  th ese  changes; substances are  also called, for this 
reason , " c o n tin u a n ts" . C learly, m o st of the  objects w e deal 
w ith  in  everyday  life, includ ing  ourse lves, are substances. 
M any years  ago I w as sm all a n d  ligh t-haired , w h ereas  no w  I am  
m uch  larger an d  m y h a ir  is darker. I am  nevertheless still the 
sam e th ing , nam ely , m yself. O bviously  all an im als an d  non liv ­
ing  m ateria l objects are  also substances, since such  th ings, as 
w e o rd inarily  th in k  a n d  speak , rem ain  self-identical th ro u g h  
changes of p ro p ertie s  an d  rela tions. If one w a n te d  exam ples of 
particu la r th in g s th a t are n o t " su b stan ces"  one  m igh t take a
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flash of ligh tn ing , a lo u d  p o p p in g  so u n d , a d ra ft of w in d , or 
an y th ing  th a t lasts only  a moment. Such item s can be charac­
terized  as "m o m en ta ry  p a rticu la rs" .
B ergm ann argues th a t there  are no  substances, or ra th e r, th a t 
a correct on to logy  canno t include  substances. A n o th e r w ay  of 
saying th is —B ergm ann 's  p re fe rred  w a y —is to  say th a t su b ­
stances are n o t d es ig n a ted  by  the  n am es of an  ideal language. 
H is a rg u m en t is m ore or less s tra igh tfo rw ard : I am  not ac­
quainted w ith  substances. This claim  seems to  explicitly con tra ­
dict th a t e lem en t of com m on-sense  realism  accord ing  to  w h ich  
w e perceive, a n d  th u s  acquire k now ledge  of, m ateria l objects. 
But B ergm ann is a rg u in g  th a t o u r  o rd ina ry  pe rcep tu a l experi­
ence of m aterial objects is n o t fundamental o r basic, a n d  tha t, 
therefore , every th ing  th a t can be said  abou t the  objects of such  
experience can be said  by  speak ing  ab o u t ontologically  fu n d a ­
m ental th ings. In  sho rt, w e can, B ergm ann  co n ten d s, " reco n ­
struct"  in  princip le  w h a tev er w e say abou t th in g s th a t e n d u re  
th ro u g h  change by  speak ing  abou t m o m en ta ry  th ings.
The m om en tary  th in g s in  term s of w h ich  com m onsense  
con tinuan ts  are to  be reco n stru c ted  are  sim ilar to , b u t  n o t the  
sam e as, sensa tions or "sen se  d a ta " . A  m ateria l object just is the  
tem poral sequence of colored, sh a p ed  expanses th a t w e expe­
rience w h e n  w e perceive it; th ere  is n o th in g  " b e h in d "  or 
" u n d e rn e a th "  th is m osaic of ap p earan ces  to  w h ich  the  a p p e a r­
ances "b elong"  o r in  w h ich  th ey  " in h e re " . T hat o u r  o rd ina ry  
conception  of the  w orld  con ta ins th e  concep t of co n tin u in g  
substances is d u e  to th e  g rea ter sim plicity  of a w orld  in  w h ich  
there  are few er particu lar objects; b u t  th is  is ju s t a "b o o k k eep ­
ing" device, a n d  is, or sh o u ld  be, m etaphysica lly  irre levan t to  
the  w orld  insofar as w e are  "ac q u a in te d "  w ith  it.
M inds, or m ore trad itionally  " se lv es" , are n o t trea ted  m uch  
differently  from  n o n -m en ta l substances. A  m in d  is a tem poral 
sequence of perceiv ings, rem em berings, believ ings, desirings, 
a n d  o th er "m en ta l ac ts" . A n d  again , a m in d  is n o th in g  "b e ­
h in d "  or "b en e a th "  th is tem p o ra l sequence , a h id d e n  som e­
th ing  th a t "un ifie s"  the  s ta tes  of consciousness th a t are , w h e n  
w e speak  in  an  o rd inary  w ay , ascribed  " to "  a self. T here  are
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n e ith e r m en ta l n o r  n o n m en ta l substances in  B ergm ann 's 
w orld , ev en  th o u g h  ev e ry th in g  w e can say (and  th ink) about 
such  com m onsensical item s can, in  p rincip le , be  said  in  a 
language  w h o se  vocabu lary  only  allow s u s  to  refer to  m om en ­
tary  particu la rs  an d  their p ro p ertie s  a n d  relations.
Such a w orld  m ay  seem  auste re  a n d  sparse ly  po p u la ted  
w h e n  com pared  to  the  d en se  a n d  " su b stan tia l"  w orld  of 
everyday  life a n d  of course  in  a sense  th is is true. But w hat 
d istu rb s  m o st philosophers ab o u t B ergm ann 's  on to logy  is n o t its 
sp a rsen ess  b u t its lu sh n ess . Specifically, th ey  object to w hat 
they , a lth o u g h  n o t B ergm ann  him self, m igh t characterize as his 
"P la to n ism ". The term  does n o t have  a p recise m ean ing , bu t 
very  b road ly , it d esig n a tes  anyone  w h o  believes in  the  exist­
ence of "ab s tra c t" , as o p p o sed  to  "co n cre te"  en tities. A  con­
crete en tity  is, essentia lly , any  en tity  th a t is " loca ted"  in  space 
an d  tim e (or, a t least, tim e), th a t is, w h ich  s ta n d s  in  spatial and  
tem p o ra l re la tions w ith  o th e r such  entities. (Notice th a t bo th  
m o m en ta ry  en tities a n d  co n tin u an ts  are concrete in  th is sense!) 
But the  properties of concrete en tities, in  som e view s (including 
B ergm ann 's), are  n o t them selves sim ilarly  " in "  space an d  tim e. 
T hus the  red  circle I see before m e n o w  stan d s in  (a large 
n u m b er of) spatia l a n d  tem poral rela tions to o th er particular 
objects; b u t  its color a n d  sh ap e  (circular) s tan d  in  no  such 
rela tions. It w o u ld  m ake no  sense  a t all to  w o n d e r w h e th e r  (or 
to a sse rt that) red  is to  the  left of g reen , or ju st p rio r to 
circularity.
P h ilo sophers w h o  object to  abstract en tities u sually  do  so on 
th e  basis of w h a t th ey  take to  be a "realistic"  a n d  em piricistic 
concep tion  of the  w orld . Som eth ing  th a t isn 't  located  any  place 
or any  tim e seem s occult an d  m ysterious. O ne is tem p ted  to ask 
of abstract objects, "W ell, if th ey 're  n o t in  space a n d  tim e, 
w h ere  are th ey ?"  The tem p ta tio n  len d s  s tren g th  to the  objec­
tion. But B ergm ann  feels th a t un less w e su p p o se  th a t the 
p ro p ertie s  of objects are non localized  a n d  have a s ta tu s  equal to 
th a t of the  objects th a t have  th em  w e will not be able to secure 
a realistic w orld  v iew . To u n d e rs ta n d  his reason ing  w e m ust 
consider th e  p rob lem  th a t gives rise to  the  issue.
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The w orld  consists of a p lu ra lity  of particu la r objects, b u t 
each of them  is a kind of object; in d eed , each  particu la r object is 
of n u m ero u s  k inds. O n e  th in g  m igh t be rubber, a ball, b lue, 
inflated , spherical, res ting  on  a ru g , to  the  left of som eth ing  
red , a n d  so on  an d  so on. But no w  w h a t is it about th e  object 
th a t makes it tru e  th a t it is of th ese  various k inds?  O ne  an sw er 
is th a t there  is som eth ing  w h ich  is in th e  object, or som eth ing  
to which th e  object is " con n ected " ; th is " so m eth in g "  is called a 
"u n iv e rsa l" . B lueness, sphericalness, an d  ballhood  w o u ld  th u s  
be un iversa ls, in  v irtue  of w h o se  connection  to w h ich  the  
above-m entioned  particu lar is of th e  k in d s th a t it is of.
A m ong those  w h o  find  the  n o tio n  of a un iversa l repellen t, 
one som ew hat ex trem e con tra ry  so lu tion  to  the  p rob lem  of 
g rou n d in g  o u r classifications of th in g s is the  theo ry  th a t, at 
bo ttom , o u r classification of objects is " a rb itra ry" . T hat is, th ere  
is n o th in g  " in "  or " ab o u t"  an  object th a t m akes it, say, b lue, 
except the  h u m an  conven tion  th a t th is th in g  is, accord ing  to 
ou r " linguistic co n v en tio n s" , the  so rt of th in g  to  w h ich  the  
w ord  "b lu e"  is to be app lied . In  o th e r w o rd s , there  are no  
properties in  add ition  to particu lar objects; there  are  only  w o rd s 
w hich  h u m an  beings app ly  to  objects in  accordance w ith  ru les 
of their ow n  devising. A ccord ing  to  th is  v iew , un iversa l 
p roperties  are the  " sh ad o w s"  cast by  th e  w o rd s  by  m ean s of 
w hich  w e classify th ings; b u t if w e, a n d  th u s  o u r  w o rd s  a n d  the  
ru les for app ly ing  them , w ere  n o t to exist, n e ith e r  w o u ld  the  
p roperties  of objects. T here w o u ld  ju s t be th e  objects.
B ergm ann rejects such  an  ex trem ist v iew  o n  the  g ro u n d s  of 
its conflict w ith  realism ; if the  p ro p ertie s  of objects are d e p e n ­
d en t on  the  classifying p ro ced u res  of h u m a n  beings th en , in  
effect, h u m an  beings make objects have  the  p ro p ertie s  w e 
believe th em  to have. But th e n  it w o u ld  n o t be ap p ro p ria te  to  
claim  th a t w e can know  w h a t the  fea tu res of m in d -in d e p e n d e n t 
objects are, since objects w o u ld  not have m in d -in d e p e n d e n t 
features.
W hat is m ost d istinctive of B ergm ann 's  ph ilo so p h y , h o w ­
ever, is n e ith e r h is an ti-substan tia lism  n o r h is acceptance of 
universals; it is ra th e r h is in sistence  th a t, as h e  p u ts  it, " the
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form  of the  w orld  is in  the  w o rld " . Part of w h a t B ergm ann 
m ean s by  th is  is th a t analytic  p ropositions , p ropositions true  in 
v irtue  of th e ir  "logical fo rm ", do describe reality; one m igh t say 
th a t th ey  describe the  form al fea tu res of reality. N evertheless 
th ey  do  describe something (i.e ., th ey  are  g en u in e  p ropositions) 
a n d  what th ey  describe, like ev ery th in g  else th a t is described  by 
tru e  p ro p o sitio n s , is a p a rt  of reality , is in th e  w orld . But even  
m ore fu n d am en ta lly  w h a t B ergm ann  m ean s is th a t the  form al 
characteristics of, a n d  connections am ong , th ings belong  to 
th ese  th in g s in d ep e n d e n tly  of o u r th o u g h t an d  d iscourse  about 
them . C onsider, for exam ple, a g iven  particu lar or a given 
p ro p erty . W hatever p ro p ertie s  th e  particu lar has, it seem s tha t 
it m u s t be tru e  that it is a particu lar; sim ilarly, w hatever 
particu la rs  have a g iven  p ro p erty  it m u st be tru e  that it is a 
p ro p erty . W hat is a ttr ib u ted  by  these  p ropositions  could  be 
called " fo rm al p ro p e rtie s"  or even  "fo rm al un iversa ls" . Ac­
co rd ing  to  som e p h ilo so p h e rs  the  "fac t"  th a t a particu lar is a 
particu la r consists in  n o th in g  m ore th a n  the  linguistic fact tha t 
it is d es ig n a ted  by  a p ro p e r  n am e (or a p ro n o u n ) of a given 
gram m atical sort. A n d  th e  "fac t"  th a t the  p ro p erty  is a p roperty  
consists in  n o th in g  m ore  th a n  the  linguistic  fact th a t it is 
d es ig n a ted  (prim arily) by  a p red icate . It goes w ith o u t saying 
th a t if h u m a n  b e ings d id  n o t exist th e  th in g s in  question  w ou ld  
n o t be d es ig n a ted  at all a n d  th u s , p resum ab ly , w ou ld  be 
n e ith e r p articu la r n o r  p ro p erty . This w o u ld , how ever, once 
m ore  violate B ergm ann 's  s tro n g  realistic inclinations; he insists 
th a t w h e n  w e k n o w  th e  logical form  of som eth ing  w h a t w e 
k n o w  is so m eth in g  th a t w o u ld  be th e  case even  if w e w ere  no t 
to  hav e  th o u g h t of it.
B ergm ann 's  realistic concep tion  of logical form  is com pli­
ca ted  a n d  ex tensive. N o t on ly  are th e  form al un iversa ls m en ­
tio n ed  above to  be  tre a te d  in  a realistic m an n er, b u t so are 
m an y  o th e r form al characteristics of th in g s a n d  facts. H e 
co n ten d s  th a t  th e  connection  b e tw e en  a particu lar an d  a 
p ro p e rty  exists; in  o th e r w o rd s , he  believes th a t the  s ta tem en t 
" th is  is re d "  desig n a tes  a p a rticu la r—th is —connected  to  a 
u n iv e rsa l—r e d —by  an  en tity  h e  calls "exem plification". Fur­
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therm ore , he  believes th a t th e  connections rep re sen te d  by 
s ta tem en t connectives such  as " a n d "  a n d  " o r"  are real entities. 
O ne m igh t call all of these  en tities " fo rm al re la tions". The 
d istinction  b e tw een  w h a t is rep re sen te d  by  th e  n am es an d  
p red icates of a language  (its descrip tive vocabulary), o n  th e  one 
h an d , an d  the  "logical" te rm s such  as the  copu la  " is "  an d  the  
s ta tem en t connectives, on  the  o ther, is cap tu red  by th e  m ed i­
eval d istinction  b e tw een  "ca tegorem atic"  a n d  "sy n ca teg o re ­
m atic" en tities, respectively . It is ex trem ely  do u b tfu l th a t any  
ph ilo sopher in  h isto ry , a n d  certain ly  n o n e  since the  M iddle 
Ages, h as  been  such  a p a rtisan  of th e  existence of the  syncat­
egorem atic, i.e ., formal, en tities.
B ergm ann has b een  criticized ex tensively  by  m an y  o th er 
ph ilosophers, includ ing  m an y  of h is o w n  s tu d e n ts  a n d  col­
leagues. It has been  claim ed th a t h is key  m ethodolog ica l ideas, 
the  Principle of A cquain tance an d  the  Ideal L anguage m eth o d , 
are n o t cogent. For exam ple, it h as  b een  claim ed th a t the  idea 
of theory-free experience—acq u ain tan ce—is incoheren t, th a t 
there  sim ply is no  such  th ing . It h as  also b een  claim ed th a t the  
ideal language is an  absu rd ity , th a t if it w ere  possib le  to 
construct a m etaphysically  p e rsp icu o u s  schem a th e n  it w o u ld  
n o t be necessary  w hile  if it is necessary  th e n  it is n o t possible. 
Even m ore p ertinen tly , it has b een  a rg u ed  th a t B ergm ann  has 
m isused  these  ideas. For exam ple, it h as  been  a rg u ed  th a t 
B ergm ann claim s th a t he  is acquain ted  w ith  th in g s th a t no  one 
else experiences, th ings such  as form al u n iversa ls , second- 
o rder un iversa ls a n d  bare  particu lars  (i.e ., m o m en ta ry  p a rticu ­
lars). It could  be a rg u ed  th a t B ergm ann  v io lates h is ow n  
princip les for u s in g  the  ideal language. For exam ple, in  his 
early u se  of the  m eth o d  h is claim  is th a t w h a t exists in  the  
w orld  is w h a t w o u ld  be d es ig n a ted  by  the  u n d e fin e d  d escrip ­
tive signs (nam es an d  predicates) of th e  ideal language . But 
th en  he  goes on  to a ttribu te  existence to  en tities  th a t are 
p resum ab ly  n o t d es ig n a ted  by  such  signs, for exam ple, " fo r­
m al" en tities th a t w o u ld  be d esig n a ted , if a t all, by  the  "logical" 
signs (e .g ., s ta tem en t connectives) of the  ideal language.
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M uch w orse  th a n  criticism , how ever, is apa thy , an d  it m ust 
be ad m itted  th a t B ergm ann 's  ph ilosoph ical concerns an d  the 
genera l style of h is ap p ro ach  to  issues are  n o t p resen tly  very 
p o p u la r  am o n g  p h ilo so p h e rs  (if, in d eed , th ey  ever w ere). A 
g rea t m an y  con tem pora ry  p h ilo so p h ers  talk  abou t h istory, 
ab o u t sociology an d  psycho logy  a n d  linguistics an d  literary  
criticism  an d  a p p a re n tly  abou t every th ing  except reality  itself, 
w h ich , one  su p p o ses , constitu tes  a so rt of back -handed  victory 
for th e  positiv ists  w h o  so u g h t to b u ry  m etaphysics. N everthe­
less, B ergm ann 's  m etaphysics certain ly  has the  feel of som e­
th in g  th a t w ill resurface  a t w h a tev er p o in t in  the  fu ture 
p h ilo so p h e rs  re tu rn  to  p h ilo so p h y  from  the  arm chair social 
science a n d  quasi-political p ro p ag an d iz in g  th a t p resen tly  oc­
cupy  th e ir a tten tions .
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